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I.  INTRODUCTION 
What is implicit bias? What does it look like? How can we define 
and address it in personal and legal contexts, working towards the end 
goal of making the workplace more amenable to successful career paths 
* Catherine Ross Dunham is a Professor of Law at the Elon University School of Law. She is an
expert in the areas of civil procedure and class action litigation and has written and spoken on issues 
related to gender bias and pay equality. She expresses gratitude here for the writing of her peers in 
the areas of gender bias and Title VII discrimination. Special thanks to Lisa Watson, Esq. for research 
assistance and Melissa Watkins, Elon Law Class of 2018, for technical guidance and overall support. 
Special thanks also to Kaitlin Bailey, Elon Law class of 2016, for her research on gender influences 
at the trial level.   
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for all engaged? These questions constitute the modern taxonomy of 
questions in the area of gender1 discrimination. Thanks to plaintiffs of the 
past 50 years and their arduous battles under Title VII with quid pro quo 
sexual harassment, hostile environment sexual harassment, pregnancy 
discrimination, gender discrimination in benefits and work assignments, 
and many other indignities, we have passed through the era of blatant, un-
actionable gender-based discrimination. Of course, certain work 
environments continue to pose threats to female workers.2 In those 
environments, employers and supervisors prey on women who are ill-
positioned to access legal and other support services, and thus continue to 
operate workplace environments that openly discriminate based on gender 
and openly threaten female employees. But the risks to female workers 
are not only present in those extreme environments. Women in safe 
corporate jobs and professional jobs, those white-collar bastions of Mad 
Men3 fame, battle an evolved species of gender discrimination, which 
flows from implicit bias against women. Generally, and specifically, this 
happens to women attempting to compete in male-driven industries and 
professions. 
Betty Dukes4 was a Wal-Mart employee who could not get promoted 
into an entry-level management position despite her employer’s 
sophisticated employment policies, which included the legally 
appropriate policies designed to protect women at Wal-Mart from gender-
based discrimination.5 At Wal-Mart, the decision to elevate employees 
into entry-level management positions was delegated to department and 
store managers. Those managers, who were predominantly male at the 
time of Betty Dukes’ employment, used their discretion in determining 
1. The term gender as used in this Article is intended to refer to all people identifying as
female and is not intended to limit the discussion of gender-based discrimination to persons who 
possess a female reproductive system and secondary sex characteristics. 
2. This Article is focused on implicit biases based on gender and cases alleging claims based 
on implicit bias.  However, this focus is in no way intended to diminish the fact that many women 
continue to work in oppressive environments where they face overt gender discrimination and sexual 
harassment. For example, for many agricultural workers, threats of rape and physical violence 
continue. See GILLIAN THOMAS, BECAUSE OF SEX: ONE LAW, TEN CASES AND FIFTY YEARS THAT 
CHANGED AMERICAN WOMEN’S LIVES AT WORK 240 (St. Martin’s Press 2016). 
3. Mad Men (AMC 2007-2015). 
4. During the drafting of this Article, Betty Dukes passed away at age 67. She began working 
at Wal-Mart in 1994 and remained in her job throughout her lawsuit against Wal-Mart, retiring in 
2016. Michael Corkery, Betty Dukes, Greeter Whose Walmart Lawsuit Went to Supreme Court, Dies 
at 67, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/business/betty-dukes-dead-
walmart-worker-led-landmark-class-action-sex-bias-
case.html?emc=edit_ca_20170719&nl=california-today&nlid=18427111&te=1 
[http://perma.cc/8TJ5-EQVA]. 
5. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 344, 353 (2011).
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which employees should be elevated to the more lucrative manager 
positions. Despite a strong work record, Betty Dukes was overlooked time 
and time again. She ultimately filed suit against Wal-Mart under Title VII 
for gender-based discrimination, arguing that it was the discretion vested 
in the junior managers that caused the gender-based discrimination. Male 
managers tended to promote male employees onto the management track, 
defaulting at times to stereotypes about female managers and perceptions 
of which employees needed the better positions to advance in the 
company or to support families at home. The culture at Wal-Mart allowed 
stereotypes about women’s ability to function as managers to block 
gateway promotions of female retail workers to managers. In this way, the 
covert message mimicked an overt message that women were less 
amenable to work and should not take jobs away from men. Betty Dukes 
argued that the male managers, who had the power to promote, used 
implicit bias against women that constituted Title VII gender-based 
discrimination.6 
Ellen Pao worked in a very different professional context.7 Ellen Pao 
was an Ivy League educated management analyst and lawyer who had 
enjoyed success in the field of banking and finance. She was praised for 
her intellect and talents and rose in her profession to a position within the 
Silicon Valley venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, 
LLC (Kleiner). She joined the firm as a junior partner performing various 
functions within the firm, including managing projects and new 
initiatives, identifying potential investments, and supporting the firm’s 
managing partner, John Doerr. Her goal was to be promoted to a full 
partner at the firm, which specialized in venture capital financing for 
Silicon Valley start-up tech companies. 
In this environment, she was a woman among men at every turn, 
dealing both with the male-dominated atmosphere of banking and finance 
as well as the male-dominated atmosphere of Silicon Valley tech. By her 
own assessment, she struggled at times to find her footing in this mixed 
environment. She also felt pressure to form good working relationships 
with her male colleagues and to please her male superiors. The firm’s 
culture8 required close contact with colleagues, and Pao ultimately 
became romantically involved with Ajit Nazre, a same-level colleague, 
after rebuffing his advances and reporting Nazre’s behavior to superiors 
in the firm. After complaining of harassment by Nazre and other partners, 
6. Id. at 345.
7. Complaint for Damages at ¶¶ 2-3, Pao v. Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, LLC, (Cal.
Super. May 10, 2012) (No. CGC-12-520719) [hereinafter Pao Complaint]. 
8. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. 
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Pao continued her work at Kleiner, working towards her goal of 
partnership. 
However, she was never considered for partner because she was 
excluded from opportunities, meetings, and events, which were essential 
to advancement in the firm. The firm relied on her personnel reviews in 
evaluating her for partnership. These reviews included evaluative 
comments that ran the gamut from her having sharp elbows and 
complaining too much, or being too quiet.9 Pao was forced to walk the 
impossible tightrope between femininity and perceptions of job-related 
masculine superiority. When she was brusque with colleagues and junior 
employees, she was criticized for mannerisms routinely employed by men 
in both the finance and tech industries. When she did not assert herself, 
she was labeled as weak. When she complained about harassment, she 
was criticized for making trouble. This storm of critique led her to leave 
Kleiner and file a claim for Title VII gender-based discrimination 
premised on the theory that her employer—despite written policies and 
procedures which protected against discrimination—used stereotypes, 
and that the male managers’ implicit biases against women colleagues 
positioned Pao for her eventual failure.10 
Betty Dukes and Ellen Pao may appear to have little in common, but 
they are both pioneers in developing a conversation about the role of 
implicit bias against women in the workplace. This Article will discuss 
their cases in greater detail to focus on a larger question regarding gender-
based discrimination and implicit bias. Courts and scholars have 
recognized the existence of structural or second generation 
discrimination, which describes aspects of an organization’s structure that 
facilitate or enable implicit gender bias.11 Betty Dukes’ case was an 
unsuccessful attempt to litigate a claim for second generation 
discrimination under Title VII, ultimately failing at the United States 
Supreme Court. Ellen Pao was also unsuccessful in her effort to persuade 
a San Francisco jury that she was a victim of second generation 
discrimination. In both cases, men and women of various backgrounds 
determined the ultimate fate of the claims. This Article asks if Title VII 
claims based on second generation discrimination are further inhibited by 
the implicit biases of judges and juries. How can a female plaintiff 
convince a fact-finder or a reviewing judge that she has been 
9. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 9-11. 
10. Id. 
11. See generally Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) (discussing aspects of an organization’s structure that 
allow or encourage implicit bias); see also infra notes 133-166 and accompanying text.  
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discriminated against through stereotypes and bias if those hearing the 
case share the same implicit gender bias? 
This Article will begin by examining the Pao and Dukes cases, 
focusing on the role of the decision-makers in the ultimate outcomes of 
those cases. The Article will then consider implicit bias as a concept, 
noting the interplay between implicit bias and gender-based stereotypes. 
Building on that understanding, the Article will explore generally the 
evolution of second generation discrimination as a legal theory, 
connecting that analysis back to Dukes’ and Pao’s cases. The Article will 
then explore the role of implicit bias in the court system, reviewing social 
science literature regarding the role of gender-based bias in the courtroom 
as it relates to female attorneys, female litigants, and the effect of certain 
“feminine traits” in the courtroom. The Article will argue that gender-
based implicit bias against female litigants plays out in the form of a Third 
Generation Discrimination, a term developed here, by layering on the 
biases of judges and juries. Third Generation Discrimination further 
undermines efforts by women seeking relief under Title VII for workplace 
discrimination based on claims that their employer allowed bias against 
them to curb their opportunities for advancement. Women will only 
succeed in implicit bias cases, such as those brought by Dukes and Pao, if 
the facts of the case are evaluated by those who can assess the case without 
regard to their own preconceptions about the role of women in the 
workplace and in society. 
II. CONSIDERING THE ROLE OF IMPLICIT BIAS IN THE FACTUAL
CONTEXT OF GENDER-BASED WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION SUITS 
As an entry point for the conversation about bias-based 
discrimination, this section examines and compares two cases filed as 
Title VII claims under a theory of second generation discrimination. The 
relevant background for the case analyses is an overview of the general 
theory of bias-based gender discrimination, which flows from social 
science literature. 
A. Bias and Discrimination Generally 
Bias is a preconceived opinion or a predisposition to decide a cause 
or issue in a certain way.12 Bias flows from stereotypes, which are based 
12. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128 (2012). 
The concepts of bias, explicit and implicit, and the related concept of confirmation bias have been 
studied extensively in social science literature. Any attempt to encapsulate that literature in this Article 
would be inept. As such, this Article offers basic definitions and references to other writings, which 
5
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on interactions with others in the regular course of society.13 Implicit 
biases are attitudes not consciously accessible, which flow from 
stereotypes.14 Implicit biases are often not understood by the holder or 
accepted as existing in relevant settings.15 
Bias flows from stereotype, and stereotype thinking begins early in 
life, found in children as young as three years old.16 Research shows that 
young people use exposure to stereotypes to interpret the world around 
them, relying on messages from families, communities, and media to 
confirm or challenge the stereotype thinking.17 As individuals grow, the 
stereotypes harden.18 Even though a person may develop “non-biased 
views of the world,” stereotype thinking tends to become automatic, 
leading to implicit biases.19 Once a person reaches adulthood their implicit 
biases have been absorbed into their unconscious thinking process, and 
they rely on the stereotypes giving rise to those biases to frame their 
understanding of the world around them.20 
This evolution of implicit bias, specifically gender-based implicit 
bias, is a central tenet of gender discrimination in the workplace. Gender-
based implicit bias flows from uncorrected stereotype thinking about the 
differences between men and women.21 Workplace discrimination, based 
explore the issues with greater depth and scope. 
13. Id. “A stereotype is an association between a concept . . . and a trait.” Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 1132. “[E]xplicit biases are attitudes and stereotypes that are consciously accessible 
through introspection and endorsed as appropriate. If no social norm against these biases exists within 
a given context, a person will freely broadcast them to others. But if such a norm exists, then explicit 
biases can be concealed to manage the impressions that others have of us. By contrast, implicit biases 
are attitudes and stereotypes that are not consciously accessible through introspection. If we find out 
we have them, we may indeed reject them as inappropriate.” Id.  
16. Justin Levinson & Danielle Young, Implicit Gender Bias in the Legal Profession: An
Empirical Study, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (2010) (citing Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-
Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 203–04 (2005)). 
17. See Page, supra note 16. 
18. See Levinson & Young, supra note 16, at 6. 
19. Id. Levinson and Young use this example related to gender bias: “In the context of gender 
stereotypes, children are likely to learn at an early age that men are ‘competent, rational, assertive, 
independent, objective, and self-confident,’ and women are ‘emotional, submissive, dependent, 
tactful, and gentle.’” Id. (quoting Diane L. Bridge, The Glass Ceiling and Sexual Stereotyping: 
Historical and Legal Perspectives of Women in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 581, 604 
(1997)). 
20. Levinson & Young, supra note 16, at 6; see also Deborah L. Rhode, The Subtle Side of
Sexism, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 613, 618 (2007) (discussing the role of stereotypes and 
perceptions in the workplace). 
21. See generally Charles Elliot, Juries, Sex and Emotional Affect, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 
37, 38 (2011) (evaluating the impact of sex stereotypes on the legal process). 
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on implicit bias, has been pursued under a theory of second generation 
discrimination.22 
To clarify, early gender-based workplace discrimination cases are 
described here as first generation discrimination cases. First generation 
discrimination was grounded in the explicit biases of male employers, 
supervisors, and co-workers against female colleagues.23 In early gender 
discrimination cases, male supervisors were alleged to have discriminated 
against women in overt ways, either through discriminatory policies or 
through discreet actions designed to intimidate and harass female 
workers.24 Although the history of legal action for gender-based 
workplace discrimination began to take shape in the 1970s, the workplace 
practices long pre-dated the early cases.25 Discriminatory practices 
existed because there was no professional or social cost to a man who 
discriminated against a woman in the workplace. If a male worker asserted 
a female worker was not suited to higher-level or higher paying work 
because of her sex, there was no pushback from either the male worker’s 
supervisor, his colleagues, or even the female workers. His attitude, which 
flowed from the generally accepted stereotypes of men and women, was 
determined valid and did not raise issues of fairness in the minds and 
practices of employers. This was true in most workplace contexts, even 
those where physical size, strength, or level of education were not 
essential to the work assigned. 
The workplace was simply a mirror of the greater social context 
wherein men worked and women acted as either caretakers or employees 
in traditionally female occupations, such as nursing, teaching, or clerical 
support.26 Since the attitudes within the workplace followed the overall 
social norms of the time, no punishment—legal, social, or personal—was 
levied for constructing a workplace environment that excluded or 
inhibited female employees. For that matter, the actions and attitudes now 
determined to be discriminatory were not even seen as such prior to the 
evolution of gender-based workplace discrimination law.27 
22. Sturm, supra note 11, at 460; see infra pp. 76-85 regarding the theory of second generation 
discrimination.  
23. Sturm, supra note 11, at 465-66.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 466-67. 
26. Id.
27. Id.; see also THOMAS, supra note 2, at 3. 
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B. Pao v. Kleiner 
Ellen Pao was not a slacker. She earned an electrical engineering 
degree from Princeton University, a law degree from Harvard Law 
School, and an MBA from Harvard Business School. She had worked in 
“Big Law” before entering business and beginning her business career 
working in technology firms.28 In 2005, she joined Kleiner, a Silicon 
Valley venture capital firm that raises funds from wealthy institutional 
and individual investors and invests those funds in technology 
companies.29 
Kleiner’s structure included junior, senior, and managing partners.30 
Pao joined Kleiner as a junior partner with every intention of advancing 
to the highest levels and was told she would move into a full-time 
investing position after three years.31 She also had the opportunity to work 
with John Doerr, a managing partner, in which she initially wrote his 
speeches and articles, and ultimately, served as his chief-of-staff.32 In 
early 2006, Pao traveled on business with another junior partner, Ajit 
Nazre.33 After the trip, Pao complained that Nazre made unwanted sexual 
advances toward her and became “brusque and distant” when she rebuffed 
his advances.34 According to Pao, she spent the following year managing 
Nazre’s advances.35 When she refused him, he became an obstructionist 
and excluded her from important business interactions.36 She ultimately 
consented to his advances, then ended their relationship in October 
2006.37 Pao contends that after she ended the relationship, Nazre retaliated 
in the form of further exclusion from access to important business 
matters.38 Pao complained to Kleiner management and the human 
resources department, but received no relief.39 According to Pao, 
members of the firm told her this retaliation was unfair, but that she should 
probably just accept it and even consider continuing her relationship with 
28. Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 5. 
29. Id. ¶ 7. 
30. Id. ¶ 6. 
31. Id. ¶ 7. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. ¶ 8. 
34. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. 
35. Id. ¶ 8. 
36. Id. ¶ 9; Trial Brief of Plaintiff Ellen Pao at 2, Pao v. Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers,
LLC, (Cal. Super. Feb. 17, 2015) (No. CGC-12-520719) [hereinafter Pao Trial Brief]. 
37. Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 8. 
38. Id. ¶ 9. 
39. Id. 
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Nazre to better her career advancement.40 Pao also reported unwanted 
romantic advances from another Kleiner partner and again received no 
responses from Kleiner management.41 Nazre was promoted to senior 
partner in December 2007 and put in a position of supervision over Pao.42 
When Pao complained about Nazre’s supervision of her, in light of their 
earlier relationship and in light of his new office location across the hall 
from Pao, Pao was asked to relocate her office, which she refused on the 
basis of it being retaliation. She was then offered relocation to the China 
office, which she also refused.43 
Three years after her arrival at Kleiner, Pao was not given a 
performance review, and thus, could not be evaluated for a next-level 
partnership position.44 By this time, she was labeled as a complainer and 
was not able to make her case for promotion or rebut her detractors 
because of management’s refusal to review her. She continued to be 
excluded from business matters, including exclusion from essential 
activities during an important New York board-level meeting in October 
2011.45 In December 2011, Pao learned that another female employee had 
complained about Nazre’s sexual harassment.46 That complaint led to an 
internal investigation. Following the internal investigation, Nazre left 
Kleiner47 and Pao filed suit in San Francisco Superior Court for gender 
discrimination under California law.48 
Pao’s gender discrimination claims were grounded in California’s 
Fair Employment and Housing Act, which allows claims for gender-based 
discrimination and retaliation, which are substantially similar to Title VII 
claims.49 Under federal law, Pao’s claims would be considered disparate 
impact workplace discrimination claims. She was not alleging quid pro 
quo sexual harassment, but rather that the conditions in her workplace, 
caused by the overall culture of Kleiner, as well as sexual harassment and 
gender-based discrimination by Nazre, were hostile to her advancement, 
and ultimately to her ability to continue to work at Kleiner. Pao alleged 
40. Id. 
41. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. 
42. Id. ¶ 15. 
43. Id. ¶ 16. 
44. Id. ¶ 19. 
45. Id. ¶ 32. 
46. Id. ¶ 31. 
47. Id. ¶ 31, 47; Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4. 
48. Pao Complaint, supra note 7. 
49. The California Fair Employment and Housing Act, WEST’S ANN. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 
12900–906 (West through 2017 Sess. Ch. 859). Pao’s state law claims were substantially the same as 
Betty Dukes’s claim for Title VII gender discrimination—both women alleged they were victims of 
second generation discrimination. 
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that Kleiner had an overall culture that favored male employees, 
demonstrated by the firm’s acceptance of Nazre’s sexual advances and 
failure to respond to Pao’s complaints about the actions of Nazre and 
others.50 Furthermore, Pao argued that her performance evaluations were 
heavily focused on Kleiner’s partner assessments of her interpersonal 
skills, commenting she was “territorial,” while also criticizing her for 
acting entitled and complaining too much.51 Some evaluations urged her 
to be less aggressive, some urged her to be less passive and not wait for 
orders from others, and others labeled her entitled and not trustworthy.52 
In further support of her second generation discrimination claim, Pao 
argued Kleiner had a practice of advancing male candidates over female 
candidates.53 Kleiner had not had a female partner since its inception in 
the 1970s until 2005, the year of Pao’s hire.54 In 2009, Pao was among six 
junior partners eligible for promotion to senior partner status at Kleiner.55 
In 2011, three male junior partners were promoted to senior partner over 
four eligible female junior partners, including Pao, despite the fact that 
the women had more experience and longer tenures than any of the male 
candidates.56 According to Kleiner management, the promotion decisions 
followed an analysis of the candidate’s successful business outcomes for 
the firm.57 However, none of the three promoted male partners had 
successful business outcomes for Kleiner prior to promotion.58 In contrast, 
Pao had been instrumental in Kleiner’s investment in RPX Corporation, 
leading to a successful initial public offering in 2011.59 Kleiner did not 
promote a woman into a senior partner role until 2012, which was after 
Pao filed her lawsuit.60 
At base, the Kleiner workplace had similar attributes to the Wal-Mart 
workplace: the supervisors were male and the culture fostered the 
advancement of male candidates by allowing implicit biases against 
50. Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 37. 
51. Trial Brief of Defendant Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, LLC at 6, Pao v. Kleiner
Perkins Caufield & Byers, LLC, (Cal. Super. Feb. 17, 2015) (No. CGC-12-520719) [hereinafter 
Kleiner Trial Brief]; See Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 23, 27, 30. 
52. Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4-5 (explaining that Pao’s company claimed she was not 
talkative enough in meetings and that she had issues with her colleagues for “much of her 
employment”); see Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 23, 27, 30. 
53. Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 19.
58. Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
10
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female candidates to play a role in promotion and pay decisions. Kleiner 
merged two male-dominated professional worlds—finance and tech. The 
Silicon Valley tech industry has been widely criticized as being male-
dominated and, at times, hostile to female intrusion.61 The tech industry’s 
reluctance to hire and promote female professionals may flow from 
general antipathy towards women in the STEM fields, which has led to 
male-dominated contexts in higher education and professional 
environments.62 The Silicon Valley tech culture is heavily populated by 
men who have not worked with women and lack an understanding of 
female colleagues without reference to stereotypes.63 Banking and finance 
has long been male-dominated, with a culture so testosterone-driven as to 
be examined academically and immortalized in pop culture.64 Banking 
has evolved into a better environment for female employees, but the world 
of venture capital financing is still male-dominated and focused on big 
deals and major players.65 This blending of professional cultures defined 
the Kleiner culture, and Pao argued that these factors, among others, 
interfered with her opportunities for success in the firm. 
A San Francisco jury heard Pao’s case in 2015 and on March 27, 
2015, a jury of six men and six women delivered a verdict in favor of 
61. See Vauhini Vara, The Ellen Pao Trial: What Do We Mean by “Discrimination”?, THE 
NEW YORKER (Mar. 14, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-ellen-pao-trial-
what-do-we-mean-by-discrimination [http://perma.cc/FPC9-4MXD] (“Deborah Rhode, a law 
professor at Stanford, told me, ‘The sort of evidence you’re seeing in the Ellen Pao case is very typical 
of what’s out there in Silicon Valley. There are no smoking guns; much of it is what social scientists 
call micro-indignities—small incidents that viewed individually may seem trivial, but when viewed 
cumulatively point to a practice of insensitivity and devaluation that can get in the way of work 
performance.’”). 
62. See Ernesto Reuben et al., How Stereotypes Impair Women’s Careers in Science, 111
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF U.S. 4403 (2013); see also Lawrence H. Summers, 
President, Harvard Univ., Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the Science & Engineering 
Workplace, p. 5 (Jan. 14, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://www.harvard.edu/president/speeches/summers_2005/nber.php [http://perma.cc/NYE7-F37R]) 
(explaining that Harvard President Larry Summers suggested that one reason there are relatively few 
women in top positions in science may be “issues of intrinsic aptitude”). 
63. Summers, supra note 62, at 2, 4, 6, 7; see also Pao’s Trial Brief, which notes that from its 
inception in the 1970s until 2009, every managing partner was male, thus preventing the male Kleiner 
partners from working with women colleagues on venture capital projects. Pao Trial Brief, supra note 
36, at 3. 
64. See THE WOLF OF WALL STREET (Red Granite Pictures 2013). For an interesting discussion 
of sexual harassment in the legal workplace, see Pamela J. White & Susan R. Matluck, Conduct 
Unbecoming a Lawyer: Expanding Tort Remedies for Sexual Harassment, 24 Brief 16, 59 (1995); see 
generally THOMAS, supra note 2. 
65. Valentina Zarya, Venture Capital’s Gender Gap is Actually Getting Worse, FORTUNE 
MAGAZINE (Mar. 13, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/13/female-founders-venture-capital/ 
[http://perma.cc/P2XH-GBUA].  
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Kleiner on all of Pao’s claims.66 On the issue of gender discrimination, 
the jury voted 10–2 in favor of Kleiner with the vote counts split evenly 
by gender.67 On the question of whether Kleiner had retaliated against Pao 
for complaining of sexual harassment by not promoting her to partner, the 
jury again found in favor of Kleiner 10–2.68 She was awarded no damages 
by the jury on any aspect of her claim.69 
Workplace discrimination lawsuits are notoriously complex and 
risky at trial. It is very hard to determine how a jury will react to the parties 
in the case, who are invariably witnesses, and to information about the 
culture in each workplace. In most Title VII claims, a jury will most likely 
hold a defendant accountable when a female employee is forced into a 
sexual relationship with a supervisor or required to work in an area with 
posted pornography and sexually offensive content. Most juries will be 
sympathetic to a woman who is denied a job, pay, benefits, or promotion 
because of her gender, her pregnancy, or her caretaker responsibilities. In 
the past 50 years, society has evolved to a point where acceptance of this 
level of indignity is marginalized. However, people continue to use 
stereotypes as a means to assess the parties in a lawsuit and the relevant 
facts.70 If a juror, male or female, follows the stereotype that successful 
women are pushy and unpleasant, that juror will be inclined to assess the 
female plaintiff’s performance evaluations as true reflections of a person 
who is hard to work with, regardless of gender.71 Likewise, if a juror is 
inclined to believe that a female subordinate is more likely to have 
seduced her boss than he is to have harassed her, that juror is inclined to 
disbelieve a woman’s allegation of sexual harassment and retaliation.72 
These implicit biases against women can form the lens through which the 
66. Dan Brekke, Ellen Pao vs. Kleiner Perkins: Jury Rejects Gender Discrimination Claims, 
KQED NEWS (Mar. 27, 2015) https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2015/03/24/final-arguments-in-ellen-pao-
gender-discrimination-trial/ [http://perma.cc/P37A-5PLK]. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id.; see also Heather Kelly, Ellen Pao Drops Appeal, Will Pay Kleiner Perkins $276K,
CNN MONEY (Sept. 10, 2015) http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/10/technology/ellen-pao-kleiner-
perkins-case-ends/index.html [http://perma.cc/SJJ2-GNTX] (explaining that Pao lost on all four 
counts and received no monetary award; she was later ordered to pay Kleiner $276,000 in legal costs 
and fees). 
70. See generally Kang et al., supra note 12 (noting that explicit biases of jurors pose a different 
threat to fairness than the threat posed by people with implicit biases who remain on a jury). 
71. See id.; see generally Shelley Correll & Caroline Simard, Research: Vague Feedback is
Holding Women Back, HARV. BUS. REV. (2016); see also Hon. Cheryl Ann Krause, From the Bench: 
Moving Beyond Gender: Effective Deployment of the Legal Arsenal, 43 A.B.A. J. LITIG. 66 (2017).  
72. Brekke, supra note 66. 
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jury views the facts, thus negating any practical application of second 
generation discrimination. 
C. Wal-Mart v. Dukes 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes is an employment discrimination lawsuit filed in 
federal court in 2001, grounded in the law protecting women from gender-
based discrimination in the workplace.73 The case alleged, based on the 
experience of lead plaintiff Betty Dukes and others, that Wal-Mart made 
promotion decisions that favored male employees and paid women less 
than their male counterparts in comparable positions.74 At base, the 
plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart’s corporate policy of allowing individual 
managers to make discretionary pay and promotion decisions created a 
corporate culture that discriminated against women, while allowing male 
employees to succeed and advance.75 The Dukes plaintiffs did not allege 
that Wal-Mart had an express corporate policy against the advancement 
of women, rather the plaintiffs complained that the “local managers’ 
discretion over pay and promotions is exercised disproportionately in 
favor of men, leading to an unlawful disparate impact on female 
employees.”76 Plaintiffs further alleged that because Wal-Mart was aware 
that its policies had the effect of disadvantaging female employees, its 
refusal to alter the policies allowing manager discretion amounted to 
disparate impact, making Wal-Mart liable to all employees negatively 
affected by the discretionary pay and promotion policies.77 The lawsuit, 
styled as a class action lawsuit brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), sought 
injunctive and declaratory relief, back pay, and punitive damages.78 
The lawsuit reached the United States Supreme Court by Wal-Mart’s 
appeal of a district court decision certifying the class, which was affirmed 
by the court of appeals.79 The focus of Wal-Mart’s appeal was on the 
decision to certify the class identified as consisting of “all women 
employed at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store at any time since 
December 26, 1998, who have been or may be subjected to Wal-Mart’s 
73. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
74. Id. at 343-45. 
75. Id. at 345. 
76. Id. at 344. 
77. Id. at 345.
78. Id.; see also Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012) (allowing class actions 
to meet the subject matter jurisdiction requirements for federal court if minimal diversity is met and 
the aggregated claims of the class members are in excess of $5,000,000.00); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 
(analyzing in Wal-Mart v. Dukes whether the lawsuit met the prerequisite of commonality under Rule 
23(a)(2)). 
79. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 347-48. 
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challenged pay and management track promotions policies and 
procedures.”80 The plaintiff class was estimated at 1.5 million persons and 
thought to be one of the largest class actions ever, particularly in the 
context of a Title VII gender discrimination or disparate impact lawsuit.81 
As the Court noted, the size of Wal-Mart’s operations and total number of 
employees nationwide created the risk of large-scale action if Wal-Mart 
employed discriminatory practices in evaluating employees for promotion 
and pay increases.82 The scale of the lawsuit, when combined with the 
disparate impact theory, created an ambitious proposition for litigation. 
The plaintiffs would have to show not that one, a few, or even a district of 
Wal-Mart’s female employees were adversely impacted by the 
discretionary pay and promotion policies, but that all female employees 
had suffered harm. Given that pay and promotion policies were 
discretionary, thus unique to every store, region, or district, the alignment 
of all female employees into one class created insurmountable difficulties 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, particularly the requirement 
that all members of the class share questions of law and fact in common.83 
Although not the primary purpose of this Article, the Rule 23 context 
of the Court’s decision is important to the case’s role in the overall 
analysis of implicit bias. The Rule 23(a) requirement of commonality 
forms one of four prerequisites to class certification, regardless of the 
remedies sought.84 Traditionally, the class’s ability to demonstrate at the 
certification stage that all the class members shared common questions of 
fact or law rested largely on the description of the class as provided in the 
Complaint.85 Through early workplace discrimination cases, plaintiffs 
learned that a certain type of overreaching in the class description could 
lead to a failure to certify a class under Rule 23.86 For example, attempts 
to certify classes of workers who were not promoted based on a 
discriminatory reason in the same lawsuit with persons who were not 
hired based on discriminatory reasons failed the commonality requirement 
because the class contained two distinct groups of persons who had 
80. Id. at 346. 
81. Id. at 342. 
82. Id. at 345. 
83. Id. at 359-60; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. The Rule 23(a) prerequisites are: “(1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” 
Id.  
85. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982). 
86. Id. at 156-58. 
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss1/2
2017] THIRD GENERATION DISCRIMINATION 69 
suffered differing injuries.87 In those cases, the common feature was the 
defendant; the same employer had acted against both current and 
prospective employees. 
In the Dukes lawsuit, the class description limited itself to female 
employees at United States retail stores after December 26, 1998.88 The 
class was further limited to those female employees who had been 
subjected to the relevant policies.89 Estimates on the numerical size of the 
class were based on Wal-Mart’s employee data, but the actual numerical 
size of the class could only be determined after the class was certified and 
given notice of the action.90 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
identified early in the opinion that “the crux of this case is 
commonality.”91 Justice Scalia noted that the mere fact that a group of 
employees all claim to have been discriminated against by their employer 
is insufficient to show commonality—the claims must depend on a 
“common contention.”92 “‘What matters to class certification . . . is not 
the raising of common “questions” . . . but rather the capacity of a 
classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the 
resolution of the litigation.’”93 Based on this broad reading of the 
commonality requirement, the Court found that establishing commonality 
“necessarily overlaps” with an analysis of plaintiffs’ claims that Wal-Mart 
engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination.94 
The commonality analysis served as the Court’s platform to analyze 
the plaintiff class’s Title VII claim based on the theory of second 
generation discrimination.95 Second generation discrimination stands 
apart from first generation discrimination as it involves subtle actions and 
patterns of preference that exclude certain groups over time.96 First 
generation discrimination involves easy-to-recognize, blatant 
87. Id. at 151, 158. 
88. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 346. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 349. 
92. Id. at 350 (“[T]he mere claim by employees of the same company that they have suffered
a Title VII injury . . .  gives no cause to believe that all their claims can productively be litigated at 
once. Their claims must depend upon a common contention—for example, the assertion of 
discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor.”). 
93. Id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)). 
94. Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 352 (“In this case, proof of commonality necessarily overlaps 
with respondents’ merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in a pattern or practice of 
discrimination.”).  
95. Sturm, supra note 11, at 460. 
96. Id. (calling such claims “second generation” discrimination claims because they are
“difficult to trace directly to intentional, discrete actions of particular actors”). 
15
Dunham: Third Generation Discrimination
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
70 AKRON LAW REVIEW [51:55 
discrimination, such as has been litigated in Title VII cases since the 
1970s.97 The Court in Dukes recognized that second generation 
discrimination was a viable theory of recovery under Title VII, and even 
noted that giving discretion to lower-level supervisors can create liability 
for the employer under a disparate impact theory of discrimination, as a 
“‘system of subjective decision-making [can have] precisely the same 
effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional 
discrimination.’”98 But the Court imparted that the fact that one manager 
may use discretion inappropriately does not create a common question of 
law or fact for the entire employee class.99 Justice Scalia, writing for the 
Court, found that to certify the class the plaintiffs must show a common 
mode of exercising discretion that affects all employees in the 
company.100 
In reaching this decision, the Court conducted what was, for all 
intents and purposes, a merits analysis of plaintiffs’ claim. The court 
reviewed and rejected three categories of evidence the plaintiffs brought 
forth to show the company-wide effect of the discretionary pay and 
promotion policies. First, the plaintiffs had submitted statistical evidence 
regarding the disparities in pay and promotion for female employees 
throughout Wal-Mart retail stores.101 The Court found the evidence 
insufficient to show commonality, noting that even if the data showed 
disparities across regions or across the nation, it was insufficient to show 
how the challenged employment practice tied together the claims of 
approximately 1.5 million employees.102 In this regard, the Court 
suggested that the plaintiff class members needed individual proof of 
injury, a position completely inapposite to class action litigation. The 
plaintiffs also submitted anecdotal evidence—statements from female 
employees at various retail stores.103 The Court found this evidence 
insufficient in type and quality, stating that even if every statement was 
97. Id. at 466.
98. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 355 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
990-91 (1988)). 
99. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 355-56. 
 100.  Id. at 359 (“Because respondents provide no convincing proof of a companywide 
discriminatory pay and promotion policy, we have concluded that they have not established the 
existence of any common question.”). 
101.  Id. at 356-57. 
 102.  Id. at 357 (“Even if it established (as it does not) a pay or promotion pattern that differs 
from the nationwide figures or the regional figures in all of Wal-Mart’s 3,400 stores, that would still 
not demonstrate that commonality of issue exists.”). 
103.  Id. at 358. 
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true, the evidence was not enough to demonstrate company-wide 
discrimination.104 
The majority’s review of the evidence submitted at the certification 
stage and its analysis of the second generation discrimination claim under 
Title VII contain several outstanding observations which belie the 
majority’s inability to understand the difficulties women have navigating 
the mixed-gender workplace. Notably, the Court finds that managers are 
unlikely to rely on gender-based criteria when using discretion to promote 
or raise pay for employees.105 The Court reasoned that the manager would 
be unlikely to do so when there are corporate policies that forbid sex 
discrimination.106 This analysis assumes that the supervising managers are 
all of impeccable character and will defer at all times to the company’s 
direction. What is more likely, however, is that the store manager will see 
the company’s gender discrimination policies as legal requirements the 
company must publish and any training on those matters as a part of the 
job he must endure. He is also more likely to promote people he likes, 
regardless of gender.107 If his preferences create greater affinities with 
other men, then those employees stand a greater chance at promotion.108 
This type of self-replication is not novel—people have been advancing 
the careers of others like themselves since time immemorial. As Justice 
Ginsberg noted in her dissent: 
 104.  Id. (“Even if every single one of these accounts is true, that would not demonstrate that the 
entire company ‘operate[s] under a general policy of discrimination’ which is what respondents must 
show to certify a companywide class.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 105.  Id. at 355 (“[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any corporation—and surely most 
managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-
based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all. Others may choose 
to reward various attributes that produce disparate impact – such as scores on general aptitude test or 
educational achievements.”) (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 357 (“Some managers will 
claim that the availability of women, or qualified women, or interested women, in their stores’ area 
does not mirror the national or regional statistics. And almost all of them will claim to have been 
applying some sex-neutral, performance-based criteria—whose nature and effects will differ from 
store to store.”). 
106.  Id. at 355. 
 107.  See generally Elizabeth Sarine, Regulating the Social Pollution of Systemic Discrimination 
Caused by Implicit Bias, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1359 (2012); see, e.g., Dr. Arin N. Reeves, Written in 
Black and White: Exploring Confirmation Bias in Racialized Perceptions of Writing Skills, NEXTIONS 
YELLOW PAPER SERIES (2014), http://nextions.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/written-in-black-
and-white-yellow-paper-series.pdf [http://perma.cc/UDV4-MSK6]. In the study by Dr. Reeves, a 
memo that included grammatical and analytical mistakes was disseminated to 60 law partners. Half 
of the partners were informed the memo writer was a black third-year student at NYU and half were 
told the writer was a white third-year student at NYU. For the exact same memo, the black writer 
scored an average rating of 3.2 out of 5 and the white writer scored an average rating of 4.1 out of 5. 
Id. 
108.  Sarine, supra note 107, at 1368. 
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Managers, like all humankind, may be prey to biases of which they are 
unaware.  The risk of discrimination is heightened when those managers 
are predominantly of one sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture that 
perpetuates gender stereotypes.109 
The practice Justice Ginsberg describes has even been elevated to an 
art under the label “mentoring,”110 where mentors are those in the position 
to bring along others. But if the mentors are men, and those men tend to 
self-replicate in their selections for mentees, the collective effect of that 
subjective process in an organization is gender discrimination. Despite its 
reference to second generation discrimination as a viable Title VII theory, 
the Dukes majority was blind to the reality of workplace exclusion. The 
Court’s blindness delivered the fatal blow to Betty Dukes and her co-
workers. 
III. IMPLICIT GENDER BIAS AND SECOND GENERATION DISCRIMINATION
Ellen Pao and Betty Dukes both worked in environments where 
implicit bias operated underground, allowing workplace policies to erupt 
into full-fledged workplace discrimination. The unifying component in 
both cases is male-dominated leadership at the top. In both cases, the 
predominantly male leadership was not allowed, through the workplace 
structure, to interact with women colleagues at the same level. Thus, there 
was little opportunity for male supervisors to challenge their own implicit 
understanding of male to female differences in society and, more 
specifically, in the workplace. If a male supervisor believes women are 
more emotional and his experiences validate this bias, he will have 
difficulty overcoming this bias when interacting with women in the 
workplace. Without malice, the male supervisor may operate on a 
presumption that men make better managers, as males are less emotional 
and more operational. If these implicit biases can operate without 
challenge, either through structural policies or a lack of cross-gender 
interaction, the result is a homogeneous workplace where female 
109.  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 372-73 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 110.  See Caela Farren, Eight Types of Mentors: Which Ones Do You Need?, MASTERYWORKS, 
INC. (2006), http://www.masteryworks.com/newsite/downloads/article3_eighttypesofmentors-
whichonesdoyouneed.pdf [http://perma.cc/373U-NSXQ] (“Mentoring is a learning and development 
partnership between a professional with in-depth experience and knowledge in a specific area and a 
protégé seeking learning and coaching in the same area.”); see also BUSINESS DICTIONARY, Definition 
of Mentoring, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/mentoring.html (last visited July 5, 
2017) (“[Mentoring is an] [e]mployee training system under which a senior or more experienced 
individual (the mentor) is assigned to act as an advisor, counselor, or guide to a junior or trainee. The 
mentor is responsible for providing support to, and feedback on, the individual in his or her charge.”). 
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employees cannot ascend. This implicit bias and its consequences are at 
the core of the existing theory of second generation discrimination, as 
alleged by Dukes and Pao, and the new theory of Third Generation 
Discrimination. 
A. First Generation Discrimination 
The first generation of gender-based discrimination cases dealt with 
workplace policies that appear draconian by 21st century standards. Early 
cases involved women struggling simply to attain simple job retention and 
security.111 The relative meaning of the word “sex” within the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, specifically within Title VII, was tested through a series of 
early cases.112 Ida Phillips, who was denied even an opportunity to apply 
for a position on the assembly line at Martin-Marietta Corporation 
because she had preschool-aged children, was vindicated when the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that Title VII required that “persons of like 
qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of sex.”113 
Brenda Mieth sued the state of Alabama when she was denied the 
opportunity to be an Alabama State Trooper because she weighed less 
than 160 pounds.114 Her lawsuit revealed the 160 pound rule115 as a thin 
 111.  See generally THOMAS, supra note 2 (examining court cases focused on women’s attempts 
to secure rights in the workplace). 
 112.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status 
as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”) (emphasis 
added). 
113.  Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curium).  
 114.  See generally Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 
1169, 1171-74 (M.D. Ala. 1976). Plaintiff Mieth’s case was combined and filed as a class action 
against the same defendant. Plaintiff Rawlinson had been denied a position as a Correctional 
Counselor in the Alabama Prison System because she did not meet the height and weight requirements 
for that position. Both women alleged the height and weight requirements violated Title VII. Id. 
115.  Mieth, 418 F. Supp. at 1173 (“[R]equires the following qualification [for an Alabama State 
Trooper]: (1) Graduation from a standard senior high school or GED certificate; (2) Possession, upon 
appointment, of a valid Alabama driver’s license; (3) Passage of a physical examination equivalent 
to that established by the United States Army; (4) Measure at least 5 feet, 9 inches in height without 
shoes and weigh at least 160 pounds without clothing; (5) Sound teeth and vision correctible to 20/20, 
free from color blindness; (6) Be between the ages of 21 and 36 years; (7) Must never have been 
convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving either force, violence, moral turpitude or serious 
traffic violations.”). The qualifications for an Alabama Corrections Counselor were substantially 
similar, requiring that the applicant fell between the minimum height and weight requirements of 5 
feet, 2 inches, 120 pounds and the maximum of 6 feet, 10 inches and 300 pounds. Id.   
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veil over the department’s true purpose—not to have any women as 
Alabama State Troopers—and challenged the argument that physical 
strength was a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)116 of law 
enforcement.117 The Court found there was room for an exception to job 
requirements which have a “disparate impact” on women, and that the 
BFOQ in question must be correlated to the job and effective at 
determining the necessary job requirement.118 
Another important round of first generation cases involved women 
suing employers under Title VII for sexual misconduct in the workplace. 
These cases expanded the legal heft of Title VII and outed a workplace 
indignity women had endured for years. In the most noteworthy case, 
Michelle Vinson suffered through years of relentless harassment by her 
supervisor at Meritor Savings Bank before finally seeking legal advice 
and filing suit under Title VII.119 Her case, one of the first to bring suit on 
this theory, came to trial before a judge who disregarded Vinson’s 
testimony, questioning the very existence of a sexual relationship because 
Vinson failed to complain about her boss to upper management, 
ultimately, ruling in favor of the defendant.120 Only through appeals did 
Vinson receive relief when the United States Supreme Court held that 
“when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the 
subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex” 
under Title VII, thus adding the hostile work environment theory of sexual 
 116.  See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e) (2012). The statute explains it is not unlawful to base 
employment decisions on the employee’s religion, sex, or national origin “in those certain instances 
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary 
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . .” Id.  
 117.  See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334. Dothard held that the defendants failed to rebut the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case of discrimination by showing that strength was an essential characteristic 
of the job or that the height and weight restrictions were adequate to gauge strength. However, the 
Court found that the physical requirements could constitute a BFOQ per §703(e) of Title VII upon a 
showing that the female prison guards could create a security threat in Alabama’s maximum security 
prisons, which are “characterized by rampant violence and a jungle atmosphere.” Id. 
 118.  Id. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall dissented from the application of the 
BFOQ exception applied here, noting that “the real disqualifying factor in the Court’s view is ‘(t)he 
employee’s very womanhood.’” Justice Marshall further stated that “the danger in this emotionally 
laden context is that common sense will be used to mask the ‘romantic paternalism’ and persisting 
discriminatory attitudes . . . .” Id.  
119.  See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 120.  See Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 WL 100 (D.D.C. 1980), rev’d 753 F.2d 141(D.C. 
Cir. 1985) At a bench trial before Judge John Barret Penn, Vinson was not allowed to offer evidence 
of other incidents of sexual harassment involving the same supervisor, Taylor, and other female 
employees or evidence of Vinson’s medical treatment after being sexually assaulted by Taylor. Judge 
Penn limited Vinson’s evidence to her testimony and treated the case as a “he said/she said” case, 
completely disregarding Vinson’s core allegation of workplace discrimination. Id. 
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harassment as another basis for gender-based workplace discrimination 
lawsuits under Title VII.121 
As this first generation of workplace discrimination litigation moved 
into the 1980s, employers began to adjust by creating policies that avoided 
discrimination against women generally, including pregnant women and 
women with children.122 Social norms adjusted as well, marked by 
protests and other political statements offered in response to Title VII 
litigation and the Court’s apparent support for gender-based workplace 
discrimination cases under Title VII.123 Despite this growth and change, 
other more subtle types of discrimination led to court challenges. 
Pricewater House v. Hopkins is notable.124 Hopkins was denied a 
partnership in a prestigious accounting firm and sued her employer under 
Title VII.125 The case brought forth evidence of Hopkins’s employee 
evaluations, revealing how private conversations among men about 
women can contain the same discriminatory imperative as overt 
statements and actions.126 Hopkins’s partnership evaluations contradicted 
the firm’s positive partnership nominating statement by criticizing her 
“unduly harsh” manner and suggesting she be more feminine in her 
manner.127 Her partnership application was put on “hold” and Hopkins 
was counseled by her mentor to “walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have your hair styled, 
and wear jewelry.”128 Hopkins was in a “double-bind” situation—if a 
 121.  Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (explaining that the Supreme Court accepted the EEOC Guidelines 
regarding hostile environment sexual harassment as violating Title VII, comparing sexual harassment 
to various actionable forms of racial harassment). 
 122.  See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curium); Cal. Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (upholding California law protecting a women’s job while 
she is out on maternity leave as consistent with Title VII). 
 123.  See generally THOMAS, supra note 2 (examining the ways in which social norms changed 
as a result of societal pressure and litigation). 
124.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
125.  Id. at 228.  
126.  Id. at 234-35; see also Benjamin Artz et al., Do Women Ask, 1127 WARWICK ECON. RES. 
PAPER SERIES, July 2016 (concluding that women do ask for salary increases but receive less, which 
challenges the general hypothesis that women do not ask because they are worried about workplace 
relationships); see also Correll & Simard, supra note 71.  
 127.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233-35 (“Virtually all of the partners’ negative remarks 
about Hopkins—even those of partners supporting her—had to do with her ‘interpersonal skills.’ Both 
‘[s]upporters and opponents of her candidacy . . . indicated that she was sometimes overly aggressive, 
unduly harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with staff.’”). 
 128.  Id. at 235 (“But it was the man who, as Judge Gesell found, bore responsibility for 
explaining to Hopkins the reasons for the Policy Board’s decision to place her candidacy on hold who 
delivered the coup de grace: in order to improve her chances for partnership, Thomas Beyer advised, 
Hopkins should ‘walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, 
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.’”).   
21
Dunham: Third Generation Discrimination
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
76 AKRON LAW REVIEW [51:55 
woman is seen as feminine she will be viewed as less competent, but if 
she is seen as masculine she will be less likeable.129 Hopkins argued this 
“double-bind” was based on stereotypes and amounted to gender 
discrimination.130 The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the partners 
had engaged in sex stereotyping, which led to her partnership denial and 
amounted to a Title VII violation.131 Hopkins’s case, which bears an eerie 
factual similarity to Ellen Pao’s case, is considered one of the first 
examples of second generation discrimination.132 
B. Second Generation Discrimination 
Second generation discrimination, also known as structural 
discrimination, is a theory developed by Columbia Professor Susan Sturm 
as a means to pursue relief for workplace discrimination under Title 
VII.133 In her groundbreaking 2001 article, Sturm explored the role of
implicit bias in workplace policies and established a legal theory that 
argued implicit bias among supervisors or managers; stating that those 
persons holding higher positions in the workplace hierarchy lead to 
policies which favor the majority demographics, typically white and 
male.134 
The theory argues that gender-based discrimination flows from 
“ongoing patterns of interaction shaped by organizational culture.”135 The 
interactions, particularly those interactions between male employees, 
influence access, workplace conditions, and the opportunities for 
 129.  See Brief for Am. Psychol. Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, at 37, Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167) [hereinafter Brief for Amicus Curiae]. 
The theory of implicit bias-based workplace discrimination was developed in this brief and through 
other testimony in Price Waterhouse. 
130.  Id. 
 131.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. The Court noted further that “[a]n employer who 
objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an 
intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if 
they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.” In evaluating the testimony regarding sex 
stereotyping offered by Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Susan Fiske, the Court noted that “[i]t takes no special 
training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive female employee as requiring ‘a 
course at charm school.’ Nor, turning to Thomas Beyer’s memorable advice to Hopkins, does it 
require expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ can be 
corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not her 
interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.” Id. at 256. 
132.  See Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory, 20 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 928-29 (2016); see also Sturm, supra note 11, at 468. 
133.  See generally Sturm, supra note 11. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. at 470. 
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advancement over time.136 If the group that controls access, conditions, 
and opportunities is all male, that group will begin to define “fit” and 
“success” in terms of those who fit and are successful in the workplace 
environment.137 The result is that traits deemed as masculine will take on 
a positive cast in the workplace, whereas traits deemed as more feminine 
will be unusual, misunderstood, and devalued in a male-dominated 
workplace environment.138 Ultimately, the male-dominated culture can 
lead to overt statements of bias, but second generation theory cases do not 
typically involve bad actors who harass and discriminate in the manner 
more easily prosecuted under Title VII.139 Rather, the bias-based culture 
works to affirm sexual stereotypes, thus confirming the biases of male 
workers—whether conscious or unconscious—and leading to a 
discriminatory workplace environment for women who attempt to join or 
advance.140 Sturm notes the discriminatory effect of “sex segregation and 
marginalization” in a workplace environment where stereotype-based 
biases impact overall workplace culture.141 Comments or behavior, which 
may not lead to gender exclusion in an integrated environment, can be 
discriminatory when occurring in a workplace environment that is male-
dominated and not diverse.142 
Sturm uses the following law firm example to define the key features 
of second generation discrimination: 
Consider a large law firm in which complaints have surfaced about a 
series of issues involving gender. Almost half of the firm’s associates 
are women, but the representation of women drops off precipitously at 
the senior associate/junior partner level. The firm’s senior management 
136.  Id. at 471. 
137.  Id. at 470-74; see also Artz et al., supra note 126.  
138.  See Levinson & Young, supra note 16, at 11-14 (examining gender stereotypes in the legal 
profession) (citing Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to 
Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J., 401, 439 (2003)). 
 139.  Sturm, supra note 11, at 471; see also Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 
(1986); see generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). Teresa Harris sued her employer for 
sexual harassment after being forced to quit her job to avoid her supervisor’s sexual advances. She 
appealed her case to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that a hostile 
environment cannot be proven by one single factor and struck down a requirement that the plaintiff 
alleging a hostile environment show psychological harm. Id. 
140.  Sturm, supra note 11, at 471-75. 
 141.  Id. at 471 (“The overall organizational culture affects the extent to which particular acts 
produce bias in a given workplace. Comments or behavior occurring in conjunction with sex 
segregation and marginalization may be discriminatory, while the same statements may produce little 
gender exclusion in a more integrated context.”). 
142.  Id. 
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is almost entirely male. Several firm departments, such as tax and mer-
gers and acquisitions, have particularly low numbers of women. Law-
yers at this firm “work around the clock” and frequently collaborate on 
large and complex cases. For many lawyers, the law firm functions as 
both their professional and social community. Decision[-]making about 
personnel issues is largely subjective and discretionary, with little sys-
temic assessment of its efficacy or fairness. Advancement depends upon 
informal decisions about assignment of cases, access to training, and ex-
posure to significant clients. Mentoring of new lawyers, which is also 
crucial to professional success, blurs the line between personal and pro-
fessional interaction. 
A group of women has questioned recent decisions denying women pro-
motion to partnership, the firm’s general failure to retain and promote 
women despite comparable entry credentials, and a series of individual 
incidents that triggered complaints of sexual harassment and gender 
bias. In part because the firm aggressively recruits women at the entry 
level and fails to track patterns in work assignment and promotion, the 
firm’s management has been largely unaware of any problem until these 
complaints arose. The complaints involved a range of issues: differences 
in patterns of work assignment and training opportunities among men 
and women; tolerance of a sexualized work environment by partners 
who are otherwise significant ‘rainmakers;’ routine comments by male 
lawyers, particularly in the predominantly male departments, on the ap-
pearance, sexuality, and competence of women; harsh assessments of 
women’s capacities and work styles based on gender stereotypes; avoid-
ance of work-related contact with women by members of particular de-
partments; and hyper-scrutiny of women’s performance by some, and 
the invisibility of women’s contributions to others. These complaints 
coincide with a concern about low morale and productivity among di-
verse work teams. Upon examination, the firm discovers dramatic dif-
ferences in the retention and promotion rates of men and women in the 
firm.143 
In Sturm’s law firm example, the firm has developed recruitment practices 
that encourage hiring female associates, but it has failed to create a culture 
that allows female associates to achieve and advance. The failure of the 
firm to assess its internal culture relative to its diversity goal leads to the 
type of homogeneous environment characteristic of workplaces where 
female employees experience second generation discrimination. 
Second generation gender discrimination addresses a complex 
problem as the discriminatory behaviors are based in attitudes, which a 
143.  Id. at 469-71. 
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person may not understand he possesses.144 In a law firm environment like 
the example, it is unlikely the senior management partners and the lawyers 
in the male-dominated practice areas view themselves as persons who are 
biased against women.145 If asked about gender bias, they are most likely 
to state they support equal access for male and female lawyers, they would 
welcome more qualified women into the firm’s upper levels, and they 
have worked with many talented female lawyers.146 And although some 
men may offer these remarks as cover for gender-based attitudes about the 
roles of men and women in the workplace and the home, most do not have 
a conscious understanding of bias in their workplaces or elsewhere. The 
role of implicit bias, the unconscious bias based on stereotypes that 
manifests in attitudes and behavior, is most impactful in sex-segregated 
environments, where exclusionary behavior goes unchallenged.147 
Sturm recognizes three possible constructs within the theory of 
second generation discrimination.148 First, the workplace utilizes a 
facially-neutral policy, in which the bias-based discrimination violates a 
“norm of functional, as opposed to formal, equality of treatment” by 
applying a facially-neutral practice or policy to a group of similarly 
situated employees.149 In this construct, the focus is on a group of 
employees that is predominantly female, such that female employees are 
disproportionately impacted by the practice or policy.150 The second 
construct contemplates the effect of formal policies on the dominant 
group, evaluating whether a workplace policy violates a norm of equal 
access.151 The third construct contemplates stereotype and bias, analyzing 
144.  Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1126.  
 145.  See generally Levinson & Young, supra note 16; see also Stella Tsai & Debra Rosen, 
Litigation Woman Advocate, Know Thyself: Affinity Bias in the Legal Profession, ABA (Mar. 9, 
2015), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/womanadvocate/articles/winter2015-
0315-know-thyself-affinity-bias-legal-profession.html [http://perma.cc/X4NC-LS7C] (noting that 
thinking about bias can make bias worse if the senior lawyers do not see themselves as biased and do 
not understand the need to explore bias issues in their business settings). 
 146.  See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach 
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995) 
(discussing the role of “schema” in developing implicit biases and errors in judgment caused by the 
use of schema); see also Correll & Simard, supra note 71 (noting that men may employ a “protective 
hesitation” when giving feedback to women, barring women from critical feedback needed to advance 
their careers). 
147.  See Sturm, supra note 11, at 471. 
148.  Id. at 473-74. 
149.  Id. (“One such theory would apply to decisions or conditions that violate a norm of 
functional, as opposed to formal, equality of treatment.”). 
 150.  Id. (“This theory defines discrimination to include differences in treatment based on group 
membership, whether consciously motivated or not, that produce unequal outcomes.”). 
 151.  Id. (“Second generation bias could also violate a norm of equal access, which defines 
discrimination to include employment decisions that are formally fair but functionally biased in favor 
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the effect of using sex stereotyping to exclude.152 These three constructs 
create a self-perpetuating cycle of discriminatory policies and actions, 
labeled here as the Second Generation Discrimination Continuum (see 
Figure 1.1). 
The Dukes case was premised on the theory of second generation 
discrimination, challenging Wal-Mart’s policies and practices as defined 
by the unchallenged implicit biases of male supervisors who had the 
discretion to promote from within.153 The outcome and reasoning in 
Dukes highlights the complexity of second generation discrimination 
theory as each of the theory’s three constructs were at issue. First, the 
discretionary promotion policies at Wal-Mart invoked the first construct, 
labeled as Phase I on the Continuum, in that the formal policies of 
promotion focused on group membership. The discretionary promotion 
policy allowed a manager to promote from a group of retail employees.154 
The policy was not directed at women, but at a group of employees.155 At 
Wal-Mart that group of employees was predominantly female.156 The 
discretionary promotion policy regulated the availability of promotion for 
this group, and the Dukes plaintiffs argued these facially-neutral policies 
hindered female employees’ access to management positions.157 The use 
of a discretionary promotion policy allowing the managers to evaluate the 
entire group negated any apparent discriminatory effect of the promotion 
policies, as the policies applied to the full group of eligible retail 
of the dominant group by using criteria that advantage one group over another for arbitrary reasons, 
meaning reasons that do not advance the articulated goals of the employment decision.”). 
 152.  Id. at 474 (“A third possibility is that these subtle, exclusionary practices violate an 
antisubordination principle, which itself is a plural normative category that could include 
stereotyping, gender policing, undermining women’s competence, or maintaining gender or racial 
hierarchy.”). 
 153.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 344 (2011); see also Roger W. Reinsch 
& Sonia Goltz, You Can’t Get There from Here: Implications of the Wal-Mart v. Dukes Decision for 
Addressing Second Generation Discrimination, 9 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 264, 280 (2014) (“Dukes 
fundamentally changed how courts address second-generation discrimination . . . .”). 
 154.  See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 343 (“Wal-Mart permits store managers to apply their own 
subjective criteria when selecting candidates as ‘support managers,’ which is the first step on the path 
to management.”).  
 155.  Id. (explaining that all hourly retail employees were theoretically eligible for promotion to 
an entry level management position as a “support manager,” thus the group effected by the facially 
neutral promotion policy consisted of all non-management Wal-Mart employees). 
 156.  Id. at 370 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (explaining that female employees constituted 70% of 
the hourly jobs in the retail stores and only 33% of the management positons at the time of the lawsuit). 
 157.  Id. at 344 (“These plaintiffs, respondents here, do not allege that Wal-Mart has any express 
corporate policy against the advancement of women. Rather, they claim that their local managers’ 
discretion over pay and promotions is exercised disproportionately in favor of men, leading to an 
unlawful disparate impact on female employees . . . .”). 
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employees, and thus were not targeted at the female employees.158 
However, when allowed to operate in a sex-segregated environment, 
where biases existed and were unchallenged, the effect of this formal 
policy was to functionally marginalize the female employees.159 
The second construct in second generation discrimination, labeled 
Phase II on the Continuum, evaluates whether a workplace policy violates 
a norm of equal access, considering employment decisions that are 
formally fair, but functionally biased in favor of the dominant group160 
(see Figure 1.1). In Dukes, the discretionary promotion policy was 
formally fair—it allowed promotion for any eligible employee.161 It was 
the male-dominated management that allowed this formally fair policy to 
become functionally biased as managers promoted persons like 
themselves.162 Also, Wal-Mart’s promotion policy included criteria like 
the ability to relocate, a qualification more accessible to men in traditional 
families where the male head of household can move and the family will 
follow.163 By allowing these policies to operate unchecked by corporate 
supervisors, the policies favored the dominant group—the male 
employees. 
Wal-Mart’s policies and practices also implicated the third construct 
of second generation discrimination, labeled as Phase III on the 
Continuum, which addresses the effect of using sex stereotyping to 
exclude.164 If male managers witnessed the exclusion of women as less 
suited to management, through the relocation policy or otherwise, those 
male managers were then validated in their beliefs that men were better 
candidates for promotion. The corporate culture evolved from there into a 
culture with male-dominated management—a single-sex environment 
that offered no check on bias.165 
158.  Id.  
159.  See id. at 371 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).  
160.  See Sturm, supra note 11, at 473.  
161.  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 343 (“Admission to Wal-Mart’s management training program, 
however, does require that a candidate meet certain objective criteria, including an above-average 
performance rating, at least one year’s tenure in the applicant’s current position, and a willingness to 
relocate.”). 
162.  Id. at 372-73 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); see also Reinsch & Goltz, supra note 153, at 264, 
279.  
 163.  See generally Williams, supra note 138; Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 370 (Ginsberg, J., 
dissenting). Justice Ginsberg’s dissent noted the complexity of a relocation requirement for working 
women who may not be the sole income in the family or may require family support to maintain a 
job. Id. 
164.  See Sturm, supra note 11, at 465. 
165.  See id. at 473. 
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The third construct doubles back to the first, and a continuum of 
unchecked bias develops: facially-neutral formal policies develop, the 
formal policies are applied disproportionately based on the gender 
demographics of the subject group of employees, the female employees 
have restricted access under the formal policies, the male employees 
access management as a favored dominant group, and the male-dominated 
manager group is allowed to employ discretion based on sex stereotypes 
unchecked by a formal corporate practice. This interplay between the 
three constructs creates a continuum wherein the result is a continuous 
culture of bias and discrimination (see Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1: The Second Generation Discrimination Continuum166 
 166.  See generally Sturm, supra note 11. The Second Generation Discrimination Continuum 
diagramed here is intended to visually represent Sturm’s description of the various theories, herein 
called constructs that are components of the general theory of second generation discrimination. In 
considering Sturm’s description, it became apparent how these components work together in a 
workplace to create a culture where the dominant group is able to discriminate, perhaps without 
conscious knowledge of the discrimination, further marginalizing the subordinate group(s).   
Phase I: Facially 
neutral policy functions 
as discriminatory
Phase II:  Facially 
neutral policy favors 
the dominant group
• The dominant group 
occupies the
management/supervisory 
positions
Phase III: The 
workplace becomes sex 
segregated allowing 
implicit bias to operate
• Unchecked implicit bias can 
lead to facially neutral 
policies that discriminate and 
favor the dominant group.
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Ellen Pao argued the effect of the Continuum in her case against 
Kleiner.167 First she argued Phase I, that facially-neutral policies on 
promotion to partner were operating to functionally prohibit women from 
advancement.168 As opposed to Wal-Mart in the Dukes case, where the 
retail employee group eligible for promotion was predominantly female, 
Pao’s group of Kleiner executives eligible for partnership was 
predominantly male.169 Even so, the facially-neutral policies functioned 
in a discriminatory manner when applied to the female candidates.170 
Kleiner relied on supervisor recommendations in evaluating executives 
for partnership.171 
In fact, the facts in Pao’s case are frightfully similar to the facts in 
Price Waterhouse.172 Pao, like Hopkins, was groomed for partnership, 
being given responsibilities commensurate with partnership, and 
encouraged that she was moving forward in the company.173 Also like 
Hopkins, Pao struggled with the masculine/feminine balance in her 
workplace.174 Both women received simultaneous criticism for being 
abrupt, yet weak.175 Both women were considered interpersonally 
difficult, with reviews that reported masculine behavior, such as cursing 
and shouting, and being “difficult” to work with in various ways.176 Both 
women struggled with the “double-bind” associated with being a woman 
in a man’s career.177 The facially-neutral rules regarding partnership at 
Kleiner and Price Waterhouse were not discriminatory; however, the 
over-reliance on partner evaluations, specifically the interpersonal 
167.  Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 37.  
168.  Id. ¶¶ 24, 25, 34-36. 
169.  Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4. 
170.  Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 23, 27, 30; Kleiner Trial Brief, supra note 51, at 6. 
171.  Kleiner Trial Brief, supra note 51, at 6. 
172.  Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4; see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 
233 (1989). 
173.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233. 
174.  Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 34, 37, 40; Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4. 
175.  See generally Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235; 
Correll & Simard, supra note 71 (“Stereotypes about women’s capabilities mean that reviewers are 
less likely to connect women’s contributions to business outcomes or to acknowledge their technical 
expertise.”). 
 176.  Kleiner Trial Brief, supra note 51, at 6 (asserting that Pao was labeled “territorial” while 
also criticized as “reluctant to speak out.”); see also Correll & Simard, supra note 71. An analysis of 
200 performance reviews in a large tech company showed women tended to receive vague feedback, 
whereas men were more likely to receive developmental feedback targeted to business outcomes. The 
study also showed negative feedback to women tended to focus more on communication and 
interpersonal skills. Id.  
177.  See generally Correll & Simard, supra note 71; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 
235. 
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reviews of the candidates, turned neutral policies into policies that 
functioned in a discriminatory manner, limiting the ability of women to 
advance to partnership.178 
The discriminatory effect of Phase I moves the Continuum forward 
to Phase II wherein the male employee is part of a favored dominant group 
for management positions. The facially-neutral partnership evaluation 
policies at Kleiner and Price Waterhouse worked effectively for the male 
candidates attempting to advance into a partner group composed of other 
men. Although the same weight may have been given to evaluations for 
both men and women, men’s evaluations generally contained less 
negative assessments regarding interpersonal behavior.179 If the male 
candidate was harsh or abrupt, his behavior may have been overlooked as 
it was expected of men in the firm’s culture, or it may have been praised 
as signs of intelligence, seriousness, or competence.180 Thus, evaluations 
have different weight in a sex-segregated environment where male culture 
dominates.181 As a result, the policies act to favor the dominant group and, 
therefore, more men are made partner.182 
The Continuum then moves into the Third Phase—the male-
dominated partner group is allowed to evaluate others based on sex 
stereotypes unchecked by a formal corporate practice.183 At Kleiner and 
Price Waterhouse, the majority of partners were men.184 To the extent 
those men held implicit biases against women, those biases were allowed 
to operate unchecked either by corporate policy or by cross-gender 
integration. There were no women in the upper hierarchy to police the 
application of facially-neutral partnership evaluation policies.185 Also, the 
178.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-51; Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4. 
 179.  See generally Correll & Simard, supra note 71; see also Levinson & Young, supra note 
16, at 11-13 (“[W]omen are hindered from career advancement by stereotypes that peg them as home 
and family-focused, as well as those that construe their personalities as weak and gossip-
driven . . . .”). 
180.  Correll & Simard, supra note 71, at 3. 
181.  Id. 
182.  See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that at 
the time of Hopkin’s candidacy for partner at Price Waterhouse, seven out of the firm’s 662 partners 
were women); Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 34; Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4; see also 
Levinson & Young, supra note 16, at 4 (reporting on a 2009 NAWL study finding that in the nation’s 
200 largest law firms, only 6% have female managing partners, 15% have women on the management 
committee, and fewer than 16% of equity partners are women) (citing National Association of Women 
Lawyers & The NAWL Foundation, Report of the Fourth Annual National Survey on Retention and 
Promotion of Women in Law Firms (2009)).  
183.  See Sturm, supra note 11, at 494. 
 184.  Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 462; Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 34; Pao Trial Brief, supra note 
36, at 4. 
185.  Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4.  
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male partners had few women colleagues to interact with, thus greatly 
reducing the possibility that implicit biases against women would be 
displaced by interaction with same-level colleagues.186 Without a check 
on the firms’ policies, the male partners have no incentive to change or 
improve policies, thus allowing sex stereotyping and implicit bias to 
continue to operate in the firms’ institutional culture. In both Pao and 
Price Waterhouse, unchecked sex stereotyping is evident in the 
partnership evaluations.187 
Undoubtedly, litigation, which revealed the language in partner 
evaluations as evidence of the Title VII claims, led to changed practices. 
Imagine that Kleiner changed its evaluation policies after Pao’s suit to 
remove narrative comments from the relevant form, allowing partners to 
provide only a numbered score on evaluations. If so, the new evaluations 
would have to be approved by male management. If the male management 
possesses implicit biases against women in the tech and banking 
industries, it is unlikely the new evaluation forms will take the second 
generation effect into consideration. At that point, the discriminatory 
pattern returns to the top of the Continuum with a facially-neutral policy 
functioning as discriminatory when applied to female candidates. 
IV. CONSIDERING THE ROLE OF THE COURT SYSTEM—THIRD
GENERATION DISCRIMINATION 
Second generation discrimination theory has yielded mixed success 
in Title VII litigation. The cases examined here, with the exception of 
Price Waterhouse, are examples of the theory’s failure to garner recovery 
for the plaintiff. It is reasonable to assume that at least some portion of the 
claims’ failures were due to factors unique to each case; however, both 
Pao and Dukes involved attempts to explain the complex continuum of 
implicit bias to juries and judges. This section analyzes the role of gender 
bias in the court system and theorizes that gender discrimination cases 
based on implicit bias may not be successful if presented to a fact-finder 
or reviewing court that employs its own implicit bias to the challenged 
employer actions, resulting in a Third Generation of gender 
discrimination. 
186.  See generally id.; see also Sturm, supra note 11. 
187.  See generally Pao Complaint, supra note 7. 
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A. Implicit Bias and the Jury 
The Supreme Court has endeavored to curb the conscious biases that 
effect jury selection.188 Challenges to conscious bias in jury selection 
begin with the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides the 
right for criminal defendants to have an impartial jury.189 Jury selection, 
the process of seating the impartial jury, is effectuated through voir dire 
examination, leading to a series of challenges, either “cause challenges” 
or “peremptory challenges.”190 Cause challenges in jury selection are 
monitored by the presiding judge, and thus carry less risk of shielding 
racial and gender bias because the reason for the cause challenge must be 
openly argued.191 However, peremptory challenges often involve a 
lawyer’s “gut feeling,” allowing the lawyer to eliminate jurors based on 
an assessment of which jurors benefit the client’s position, without 
argument or explanation.192 Peremptory challenges went unrestricted for 
nearly 200 years.193 In 1986, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Court declared 
that a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely 
on the basis of race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.194 Five years later, the Court held that Batson applied in civil 
cases and permitted parties to make Batson-type arguments to preclude 
racially based preemptory challenges in civil trials.195 In 1994, in J.E.B. 
v. Alabama, the Court extended the holding in Batson to include
intentional discrimination on the basis of gender, stating that the use of 
peremptory challenges to eliminate a particular gender from the jury also 
violates the Equal Protection Clause, and is thus prohibited in criminal 
and civil trials.196 
Batson and J.E.B. permit challenges to jury selection based on the 
use of voir dire to achieve race or gender homogeneity.197 However, 
 188.  See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (disallowing the use of peremptory challenges 
to control the gender balance on a jury); see generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) 
(disallowing the use of peremptory challenges to control the racial make-up of a criminal jury). 
189.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
190.  FED. R. CIV. P. 47 (allowing for juror voir dire and cause and peremptory challenges). 
191.  Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 
408 (1895)).  
 192.  Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Bias in Jury Selection: Justifying Prohibited 
Peremptory Challenges, 20 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 467, 468 (2007). 
193.  Id. at 469. 
194.  476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).   
195.  Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991).   
196.  511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994).  
197.  See Deborah L. Forman, What Difference Does it Make? Gender and Jury Selection, 2 
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 35 (1992) (providing an overview of the historical antecedents to modern jury 
selection cases). 
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courts and litigants have struggled to effectively implement strategies that 
determine the role of jurors’ implicit biases in decision-making.198 As 
noted in Part II above, implicit biases often operate without 
acknowledgement by the holder.199 A person may not be aware of her own 
biases or the role stereotyping has played and does play in her decision-
making.200 If the holder is unaware of the bias, the voir dire process is 
unlikely to reveal biases that can affect the outcome of a trial, as a juror 
can honestly answer a voir dire question without revealing an outcome-
determinative bias.201 Research has been done on the role gender plays in 
courtroom dynamics, finding that juries react differently to female 
attorneys and female litigants.202 The research supports the view that 
implicit bias effects the juror’s assessment of the case depending on what 
is at issue, who is arguing the case, and who is seeking relief.203 How can 
claims for second generation discrimination prevail if implicit bias against 
women is at play in the courtroom, especially in a workplace 
discrimination case, like Ellen Pao’s, where a female plaintiff who was 
represented by a female attorney204 was seeking relief from a male-
dominated employer through a jury equally divided between men and 
women? 
198.  Id. at 56. 
199.  See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.  
200.  See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.  
201.  Forman, supra note 197, at 72 (“[B]ecause of their desire to please the person in the most 
authoritative position, jurors questioned by judges during voir dire may not respond honestly. Rather, 
cued by the form of the questions or the judge’s demeanor, the jurors may provide the answer they 
believe the judge wants to hear.”). 
 202.  Shari V.N. Hodgson & Burt Pryor, Sex Discrimination in the Courtroom: Attorney’s 
Gender and Credibility, 71 WOMEN LAW. J. 7 (1985). Research completed by Hodgson and Pryor 
studied the relationship between attorney’s gender and perceived credibility and showed that it was 
the women participants who rated female attorneys significantly lower on six of the twelve credibility 
scales. In the Hodgson and Pryor study, research participants read a summary of a mock court case 
involving charges of breaking and entering. The participants then listened to an audiotape of a closing 
argument. The closing arguments were the exact same textually but half of the participants heard a 
female attorney give the argument and the other half heard a male attorney give the argument. The 
results of the study showed that women rated the female attorney significantly less intelligent, less 
friendly, less pleasant, less capable, less expert, and less experienced than the male attorney, while 
male participants did not show any preference in attorney gender. Even though male participants did 
not show a significant preference in attorney gender, the client represented by the female attorney 
received more guilty verdicts. Also, when the participants were asked if they would hire the attorney 
they heard, it was the male attorney who participants stated was more likely to be hired. This study 
suggests that women attorneys face the hardest battles with other females, both clients and jurors. Id. 
 203.  See id. at 7; see generally Monica Biernat & Kathleen Fuegen, Shifting Standards and the 
Evaluation of Competence: Complexity in Gender-Based Judgment and Decision Making, 57 J. OF 
SOC. ISSUES 707 (2001).  
204.  Brekke, supra note 66. 
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The Pao jury was composed of equal numbers of male and female 
jurors.205 However, it is naïve and somewhat offensive to assume that 
female jurors are less biased against female litigants and attorneys. In fact, 
research supports the opposite conclusion. When the relationship between 
the attorney’s gender and perceived credibility was studied, female 
participants rated female attorneys significantly lower on six of twelve 
credibility scales.206 Women “rated the female attorney significantly less 
intelligent, less friendly, less pleasant, less capable, less expert, less 
experienced, and less trained” than the male attorney.207 Another study 
showed that women hold other women to higher standards than men when 
evaluating competence.208 In considering why jurors show preferences for 
male attorneys, another study indicated that certain personal 
characteristics and traits are typically associated with the perception of 
attorney competence, and those traits are typically deemed masculine, not 
feminine, traits.209 Aggressive attorneys were typically more successful 
than passive attorneys, and aggression as a trait is associated positively in 
men and negatively in women.210 In contrast, emotion is a trait associated 
positively in women and negatively in men.211 In the courtroom, a female 
attorney who is aggressive elicits negative responses, whereas an 
aggressive male attorney is viewed as effective, zealous, and skilled.212 
205.  Id. 
206.  See Hodgson & Pryor, supra note 202, at 7. 
207.  Id. 
208.  See Biernat & Fuegen, supra note 203, at 711-14. These two studies evaluated predictions 
in hiring decisions. The first study included 175 introductory psychological students as participants. 
Participants were asked to play the role of a hiring professional. Each participant was given a folder 
that included a job description, resume, and evaluation form. The job description remained the same 
where the job title was either executive secretary or an executive chief of staff position. All 
participants reviewed the same resume with half of the resumes having the name Kenneth and the 
other half having the name Katherine. The participants would decide if they would hire the applicant 
they were reviewing. The data suggested only female participants showed evidence of predicted 
patterns and were harsher on female applicants. In study two, 64 participants were presented with 16 
applications to consider for a position of mechanical engineer. The applications created seven pairs 
and one resume was a female’s name and the other a male’s name. They were to view 14 applicants 
from the pool and select three to move on to the short list and then from those applicants, one would 
be hired. This study showed that women would be more likely to make the short list but less likely to 
be hired.; see also Hodgson & Pryor, supra note 202, at 7 (explaining that female attorneys may face 
the hardest battles when working with other women). 
 209.  Peter W. Hahn & Susan D. Clayton, The Effects of Attorney Presentation Style, Attorney 
Gender, and Juror Gender on Juror Decisions, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 533, 538 (1996).  
 210.  Id. at 548 (explaining that “successful” in this study is defined as being the more influential 
and effective attorney). 
211.  Id. at 549-50. 
212.  Id. at 549.  
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The double-bind for female attorneys in the courtroom comes into 
play when a female attorney exhibits a feminine trait, such as emotion.213 
The female attorney who is viewed as emotional may lose credibility with 
the jury because she is seen as unreliable, rather than passionate.214 A 
study of personal injury cases showed that male-dominated juries awarded 
higher damage amounts to male plaintiffs and lower damage amounts to 
female plaintiffs.215 Female-dominated juries awarded female plaintiffs 
above average damages in only 3% of cases studied.216 Other studies have 
found that female plaintiffs seeking damages in wrongful death cases with 
the loss of a male spouse are more likely to prevail and receive a higher 
damages award, whereas male plaintiffs seeking damages for wrongful 
death of a female spouse prevail less and receive smaller damages 
awards.217 
The research referenced here demonstrates the overwhelming 
complexity of gender bias in the courtroom. The research shows that 
gender bias, predominantly implicit gender bias, effects the jury’s 
assessment of the facts and parties in the case.218 A juror may assume the 
female plaintiff provides less financially, and should thus receive a 
smaller award in a personal injury case and a larger award in a wrongful 
death case where she is the surviving spouse.219 Likewise, a juror may 
generally disfavor a female litigant or attorney if the litigant or attorney is 
 213.  Id.; see also Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 129 (defining the “double-bind” 
dynamic). 
214.  Hahn & Clayton, supra note 209, at 550. 
 215.  Stuart Nagel & Lenore Weitzman, Sex and the Unbiased Jury, 56 JUDICATURE 108, 109 
(1972) (explaining that male-dominated juries awarded amounts 12% above the average award to 
male plaintiffs and 17% below the average award to female plaintiffs in cases with the same or 
substantially similar injury claims). 
216.  Id. at 110. Nagel and Weitzman analyzed data collected by the Jury Verdict Research 
Company in 364 personal injury cases. They examined the gender composition of the juries who 
served on these cases and the magnitude of the damage awards for the prevailing plaintiffs. The study 
notes that in most cases the male plaintiffs suffered more severe injuries and this discrepancy could 
factor into the study’s conclusions. Id.  
 217.  Jane Goodman et al., Money, Sex, and Death: Gender Bias in Wrongful Death Damage 
Awards, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 263, 264 (1991). The article reports on studies conducted by the 
Washington State Supreme Court and the King County Superior Court in Seattle, Washington. Data 
to conduct these studies was gathered from the Superior Court Management System and Jury Verdicts 
Research, Inc. It should be noted that while the data covered a five-year period, neither source had a 
complete record of all the wrongful death cases tried within that time. Id.  
 218.  Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1144 (“Our default assumption is juror unexceptionalism—
given that implicit biases generally influence decisionmaking, there is no reason to presume that 
citizens become immune to the effects of these biases when they serve in the role of jurors. Leading 
scholars from the juror bias field have expressly raised the possibility that the psychological 
mechanisms might be ‘unintentional and even non-conscious processes.’”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
219.  Id. 
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aggressively seeking relief.220 It may be impossible for plaintiffs like 
Betty Dukes or Ellen Pao to prevail when the case itself examines gender 
bias and places the issues of implicit bias and discrimination before the 
jury. 
B. Implicit Bias and the Judiciary 
The previous section raised the question of how implicit bias can 
operate with regard to the jurors’ evaluations of the case, the lawyers, and 
the parties. Our system of civil justice puts trial judges in the role of 
presiding over the civil trial and appellate judges over the appeal, thus any 
discussion of gender discrimination litigation must consider the role of 
implicit bias in the judiciary.221 
The trial judge presides over the jury selection process, often asking 
her own voir dire questions.222 Based on Batson and J.E.B., the party 
challenging the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on 
race or gender makes the initial objection.223 The burden then shifts to the 
other party to provide a neutral explanation for exercising peremptory 
challenges to include jurors of one gender.224 The judge then evaluates the 
sufficiency of the proffered neutral explanation.225 In racial discrimination 
cases following Batson, neutral explanations have included various 
factors, such as English language proficiency, as well as similarities in 
age, background, or neighborhood.226 In gender cases, women have been 
excluded from juries based on neutral explanations, such as marital status, 
number of children, smiling during questioning, and eye contact.227 The 
trial judge alone determines if the proffered reason for the peremptory 
strike is pre-textual, thus her own implicit biases can give effect to gender-
based exclusion if she finds the explanations gender neutral. In sum, the 
220.  Hahn & Clayton, supra note 209, at 550. 
 221.  The author intentionally switches between indicating the judges as male and female 
throughout the text to show that both male judges and females judges employ implicit biases against 
female litigants and advocates. 
222.  Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Connors v. United States, 
158 U.S. 408 (1895)). 
223.  J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 144-45 (1994).  
224.  Id.; see also Forman, supra note 197, at 58-59.  
225.  Forman, supra note 197, at 59. 
226.  Id. 
227.  Id. at 61-63 (citing People v. Irizarry, 142 Misc. 2d 793, 536 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1988), rev’d, 
168 A.D.2d 715, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1990) (discussing a state court case challenging the Bronx 
prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude women from a criminal trial jury). During voir 
dire of 34 potential jurors, the prosecutor challenged nine women and one man, offering pre-textual 
reasons for each peremptory challenge against a female juror. Id. 
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judge’s own implicit bias may lead her to accept the pre-textual 
explanations.228 
The trial judge also functions as the gatekeeper in presiding over 
motions to dismiss at the pleading stage and later in the discovery 
process.229 If a judge has an implicit bias against women, which can affect 
his assessment of the female plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim, is he 
more likely to rule in favor of the party seeking dismissal? There are no 
studies that have tested whether biases, explicit or implicit, influence how 
actual trial judges decide motions to dismiss in actual cases.230 However, 
there is no reason to think judges are immune from implicit bias.231 When 
considering the role of the trial judge in determining pre-trial motions, we 
must consider the entire nature of making judgments.232 Generally, judges 
turn to judicial experience and common sense when making 
determinations as to whether a party has a legally cognizable claim.233 
Common sense generally refers to the social context for making the 
relevant judgment—how do we understand the social context of the issues 
to be determined?234 Studies have shown that people rely more on general 
categorical information, also known as schema, to make judgments when 
they lack specific information.235 That reliance on categorical information 
 228.  Forman, supra note 197, at 63 (“Each of these explanations reflects stereotyped 
assumptions about a woman’s role, abilities, and character. Is striking a woman because she is a 
mother ‘neutral’ or pre-textual? One might conclude that it was pre-textual, at least if the prosecutor 
did not strike fathers. Should a prosecutor be allowed to excuse ‘homemakers’ or any other 
occupational category that is predominantly female? And, of course, explanations based on demeanor 
or appearance, commonly accepted to rebut Batson claims based on race, could just as easily mask 
gender discrimination. In one case reported anecdotally, an attorney apparently struck a male juror 
‘solely in order to have another woman to look at in the jury box.’”). 
 229.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 
(2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (cases holding that to survive a 
motion to dismiss at the pleading stage, the complaint must meet a plausibility standard). 
230.  Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1162. 
231.  Id. at 1146. 
232.  Id. at 1160-61. 
233.  Id. at 1160 (“How are courts supposed to decide what is ‘Twom-bal’ plausible when the 
motion to dismiss happens before discovery, especially in civil rights cases in which the defendant 
holds the key information? According to the Court, ‘[d]etermining whether a complaint states a 
plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 
on its judicial experience and common sense.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 234.  Id. (citing Vincent Y. Yzerbyt et al., Social Judgeability: The Impact of Meta-
Informational Cues on the Use of Stereotypes, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 48 (1994), which 
developed the theory of “social judgeability”).  
 235.  Kang et al., supra note 12 at 1160 (“And when judges turn to their judicial experience and 
common sense, what will this store of knowledge tell them about whether some particular comment 
or act happened and whether such behavior evidences legally cognizable discrimination? Decades of 
social psychological research demonstrate that our impressions are driven by the interplay between 
categorical (general to the category) and individuating (specific to the member of the category) 
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can be further complicated when the judge either thinks he has more 
relevant information than is actually available, as at the pre-trial stage, or 
the information available is being assessed through his own implicit 
biases.236 
For example, in a Title VII case, the judge may be asked to rule on a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), determining whether the plaintiff’s 
claim is “plausible.”237 A ruling at this stage assesses the pleadings only, 
thus the judge lacks detailed factual information that would be available 
after discovery.238 Given the lack of individuated information about the 
facts of the claim, the judge may rely more heavily on categorical 
assumptions, for example, assumptions about certain workplace 
environments or the general viability of workplace discrimination 
cases.239 The judge may rely on her knowledge of past cases, such as Ellen 
Pao’s case, which did not render a verdict for the plaintiff. She may rely 
on her own experiences in the workplace in the absence of fully developed 
facts about the case at bar. She may further consider herself better 
informed based on her own experiences and knowledge, which could lead 
her to rely too much on categorical information about gender 
discrimination cases.240 This over-reliance on categorical information is 
an impediment to quality judgments as it allows the judge’s implicit biases 
formed by her experiences to influence her assessment of the motion and 
the case. 
Appellate judges are not immune from similar questions about 
implicit bias. It would be again unreasonable to assume that judges, even 
at the highest level, are immune from the biases we all experience.241 In 
Dukes, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, included statements that 
can be read to reveal his own inexperience with workplace discrimination 
and implicit bias.242 In evaluating the unlikelihood that Wal-Mart 
information. For example, in order to come to an impression about a Latina plaintiff, we reconcile 
general schemas for Latina workers with individualized data about the specific plaintiff. When we 
lack sufficient individuating information—which is largely the state of affairs at the motion to dismiss 
stage—we have no choice but to rely more heavily on our schemas.”). 
 236.  Id.; see Yzerbyt et al., supra note 234, at 49. In discussing a study on social judgeability, 
the authors note that because participants in the study had received no individuating information about 
the study subjects, the study participants tended to judge the subjects in accordance with their 
schemas, or categorical information, about the subjects, basing their judgments on general, categorical 
information about comedians and archivists. Id. 
237.  See Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).  
238.  Id. 
239.  Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1160. 
240.  Id. 
241.  Id. at 1146. 
242.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011). 
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managers would exercise discretion in a manner that disadvantaged 
female employees, Scalia stated: 
To the contrary, left to their own devices most managers in any corpo-
ration—and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex dis-
crimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for 
hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.243 
The majority further dismissed the plaintiffs’ evidence of discrimination, 
which consisted of statistical evidence, anecdotal evidence, and an 
expert’s social framework analysis. The expert concluded that Wal-Mart’s 
culture and personnel policies made it vulnerable to gender 
discrimination.244 The all-male majority’s rejection of the social 
framework analysis as evidence of gender discrimination at Wal-Mart was 
perhaps most demonstrative of the majority’s lack of understanding of the 
claim.245 The opinion rejects wholesale the idea that certain social 
frameworks—those where male-dominated management is able to self-
replicate through discretionary pay and promotion policies—can 
substantiate a Title VII claim.246 Perhaps most telling on the question of 
whether implicit bias affected the judicial evaluation in Dukes is Justice 
Ginsberg’s dissent, which addressed the intrepid blindness of the 
majority.247 On the question of whether discretion could be used to 
discriminate, she stated: 
The practice of delegating to supervisors’ large discretion to make per-
sonnel decisions, uncontrolled by formal standards, has long been 
known to have the potential to produce disparate effects. Managers, like 
all humankind, may be prey to biases of which they are unaware. The 
risk of discrimination is heightened when those managers are predomi-
nantly of one sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture that perpetuates 
gender stereotypes.248 
There are other indicators that appellate judges, at the Supreme Court 
and elsewhere, are not immune to implicit biases in their judgments and 
243.  Id.  
244.  Id. at 356. 
 245.  See generally id. Justices Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito formed the majority 
in Parts I, II, and III. Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan concurred in Parts I and III 
and dissented in Part II, which addressed the certification of the putative class under FRCP Rule 23(a). 
Id. 
 246.  Id. at 354-55 (rejecting Dr. William Beilby’s social framework analysis entirely, stating 
that Bielby’s evidence is “worlds away” from significant proof that Wal-Mart operated under a 
general policy of discrimination); see also Reinsch & Goltz, supra note 153, at 272-73. 
247.  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 367-78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
248.  Id. at 372-73 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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their conduct.249 A recent study found that male justices at the Supreme 
Court interrupt female justices far more frequently than the other way 
around.250 The female justices use fewer words than the male justices, and 
yet are still interrupted with greater frequency.251 Changing habitual 
modes of thinking and acting on gender requires a concerted effort by the 
judiciary.252 State and federal courts have engaged in serious and thorough 
inquiry into the role of gender bias in the court system; however, the 
impact of that introspective work remains unclear.253 And suggestions that 
biased attitudes in the judiciary will “age out” when older judges are 
replaced by younger lawyers are not supported by the evidence.254 The 
result is that litigants in Title VII cases predicated on theories of implicit 
bias, and specifically second generation discrimination, face a separate 
hurdle when seeking relief in the court system. The litigant is again placed 
on a continuum of bias that flows from a male-dominated culture and 
operates largely unchecked. The court system thus subjects the litigant to 
a Third Generation of gender discrimination. 
 249.  See generally Coughenour et al., The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final 
Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1994) (reporting on an 
extensive study undertaken by the Ninth Circuit to explore gender bias at the trial and appellate court 
levels); see also Lynn Hecht Schafran, Women Shaping the Legal Process: Judicial Gender Bias as 
Grounds for Reversal, 84 KY. L.J. 1153, 1155 (1996) (examining the ruling in Catchpole v. Brannon, 
42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440 (Ct. App. 1995), review denied (Cal. Sept. 14, 1995), which reversed a trial court 
ruling based on the court’s demonstrated gender bias); see generally Vicki C. Jackson, What Judges 
Can Learn from Gender Bias Task Force Studies, 81 JUDICATURE 15 (1997). 
 250.  See Tonja Jacobi & Dylan Schweers, Justice Interrupted: The Effect of Gender, Ideology 
and Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Arguments, 103 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2017); see also 
Adam Liptak, Let Me Finish Please: Conservative Men Dominate the Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 
2017), at A13. 
251.  Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 249, at 74. 
 252.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Foreword, 84 GEO. L.J. 1651 (May 1996). In her Foreword 
to the Journal’s special section on The Report of the Special Committee on Gender prepared for the 
D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, Justice Ginsberg wrote “self-inspection 
heightens appreciation that progress does not occur automatically, but requires a concerted effort to 
change habitual modes of thinking and acting.” In a short but impactful writing, the Justice encourages 
the federal judiciary to “exert strong leadership to eliminate unfairness and its perception in federal 
courts.” The Foreword also relates an incident of “good-natured amusement” when Justice Ginsberg 
was criticized for an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. In response to the confusion, 
the National Association of Women Judges presented Justices Ginsberg and O’Connor with T-shirts 
which said “I’m Sandra, not Ruth” and “I’m Ruth, not Sandra.” Justice Ginsberg relates this incident 
to illustrate one of the study’s findings, that women attorneys are often mistaken for non-attorneys 
more than their male counterparts. Id. 
253.  See Coughenour, supra note 249, at 809-35. 
254.  See id. at 810-11. 
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C. Third Generation Discrimination 
This Article has attempted to draw together various sources to 
support a working theory that gender-based discrimination has deep roots 
in stereotype and social bias, preventing any one theory of recovery to 
prevail. Although overt gender discrimination has been largely reformed, 
the bias-based species of gender discrimination understood as second 
generation discrimination has endured despite strong legal challenges.255 
As discussed in Part II, one theory for why second generation cases have 
not been more successful is the complexity of the claims themselves.256 
In stating a second generation claim, the bias-based nature of the claim 
must be understood by the trial judge, the jury, and the appellate courts. 
And the understanding must be more than intellectual, as the very nature 
of the discrimination claim rests in human behavior that operates at an 
unconscious level. 
The Second Generation Discrimination Continuum (see Figure 1.1) 
depicts a cycle of bias-based behaviors that self-perpetuates and creates 
environments that offer fewer opportunities for change.257 A similar cycle 
has evolved in the court system’s review of discrimination cases. Overall, 
juries are no longer exclusively male, and jury pools often mimic the 
gender balance of the relevant community.258 However, studies have 
shown that female jurors employ implicit bias when evaluating female 
attorneys and litigants, thus gender diversity in the jury pool offers no 
assurance that a second generation discrimination claim will be better 
understood.259 The federal judiciary is predominantly male, meaning that 
those presiding over motions to dismiss, voir dire, and appellate review in 
Title VII cases, are less likely to possess the experiences and information 
that is necessary to facilitate a full understanding of second generation 
discrimination.260 The dynamics of judging and the demographics of the 
 255.  See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); see also Pao Trial 
Brief, supra note 36. 
256.  See generally Sturm, supra note 11; see also Continuum, Figure 1.1, supra at p. 82. 
257.  See Continuum, Figure 1.1, supra at p. 82. 
258.  See Karen L. Cipriani, The Numbers Don’t Add Up: Challenging the Premise of J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel T.B., 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1253, 1266 (1994) (explaining that the author surveyed 
the D.C. Circuit jury pool from January to June 1993, a sample of 4,302 persons, and found that in 
the 105 juries selected in civil and criminal trials during the six-month period, 55.8% of jurors were 
female and 43.1% were male) (noting that national level data on the gender composition of civil 
and/or criminal trial juries was not available). 
259.  Hodgson & Pryor, supra note 202, at 7. 
 260.  See Women in the Judiciary: Still a Long Way to Go, Fact Sheet, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., 
(Oct. 2016) (noting that there have only been four women judges on the U.S. Supreme Court with 
three currently sitting on the Court; 60 of 167 (35%) of circuit court judges are women; and 33% of 
United States District Court judges are women). 
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judiciary create another obstacle to effective relief—Third Generation 
Discrimination. 
The Third Generation Discrimination Continuum (Figure 1.2) 
Like the theory of second generation discrimination, Third 
Generation Discrimination also operates on a continuum that can proceed 
without interruption if certain factors are present. Consider a hypothetical 
case with facts similar to Dukes, where the gist of the female plaintiff’s 
claim is that she was discriminated against by her employer through the 
use of discretionary pay and promotion policies administered by male 
managers.261 The theory of the case is predicated on second generation 
discrimination under Title VII. Assume the defendant files a motion to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint per Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the plaintiff 
has failed to state a claim that is plausible on its face, triggering Phase I 
in Figure 1.2. Rule 12(b)(6) is a facially-neutral rule of civil procedure 
designed to dismiss implausible claims, eliminating the time and expense 
of further pleading or discovery.262 Assume the trial judge is male and 
261.  See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 262.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-80 (2009); Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (explaining that the plausibility standard has been 
criticized for requiring an assessment of the case itself at the pleading stage, thus requiring the judge 
to evaluate a motion to dismiss before hearing individuated information about the facts or 
Phase I:The 
Title VII  
litigation 
requires judical 
action under a 
procedural rule.
Phase II:The 
procedural rule is 
interpreted to favor 
the Title VII 
defendant.
Phase III: The
procedural rule's 
interpretation 
protects the 
dominant group in 
future Title VII 
litigation.
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lacks personal experience with gender-based discrimination either 
through his experience as an attorney or his experience as a judge. In the 
absence of individuated information about this case or these parties, the 
judge may default to categorical information when judging the 
defendant’s claim for relief and dismiss the plaintiff’s claim as not 
plausible, employing reasoning similar to the majority’s reasoning in 
Dukes.263 If so, the facially-neutral rule, Rule 12(b)(6), has been 
interpreted to favor the employer-defendant, illustrating Phase II of the 
Continuum (see Figure 1.2). 
Next, assume the plaintiff appeals the trial judge’s ruling dismissing 
her case. The plaintiff-appellant is now asking a predominantly male 
appellate judiciary to assess the lower court’s action, which requires the 
appellate court to assess de novo the plausibility of her claim.264 If the 
appellate court affirms the lower court, this interpretation of Rule 12(b)(6) 
can perpetuate a general misunderstanding of a second generation 
discrimination claim and weaken the availability of the theory for other 
litigants (see Phase III of Figure 1.2). The cycle will then repeat, as the 
first case becomes precedent for the next, diminishing Title VII litigation 
and validating the suspect employment practice. 
This Continuum adds insult to injury as it provides even more 
barriers to successful gender bias litigation. The Third Generation 
Discrimination Continuum needs an interrupter—a force that can cause 
the system to examine itself and rely less on personal experience, or the 
lack thereof, when assessing a second generation discrimination claim. It 
is beyond the scope of this Article to suggest the necessary interrupter. In 
fact, the next steps in developing a working Third Generation 
Discrimination theory requires empirical research exploring the 
procedural histories of Title VII cases predicated on implicit gender bias. 
To evaluate the role of the jury and judge on implicit bias-based Title VII 
litigation, a sample of cases should be studied, evaluating the ultimate 
disposition of the sample cases and the means of disposition. How many 
second generation cases are dismissed at the pleading stage? At the 
summary judgment stage? How many second generation cases reach a 
jury, and what is the result of jury deliberations? What is the appellate 
landscape for second generation claims? How many cases are appealed 
and what is the level of success on appeal for a plaintiff-appellant? With 
circumstances of the case). 
263.  See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.  
 264.  Women in the Judiciary, supra note 259; see also Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 568-70 (holding 
that the appellate court reviews de novo the trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6)). 
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this information, we can explore the system’s impact on these complex 
claims. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As Justice Ginsberg noted, “self-inspection heightens 
appreciation.”265 Self-inspection requires that lawyers and judges assess 
their own biases, remaining open to the possibility that we, as members 
of the legal profession, operate on our own biases in a manner which 
inhibits reform. The lack of specific information about experiences, which 
differ from our own, prompts us to revert to stereotypes and general, 
categorical information about people and places. If a male judge has never 
worked in a setting where advancement predicated on relocation would 
interfere with his career, he may not fully understand the chilling effect 
that requirement has on a female employee, otherwise qualified for 
promotion, who is not in a position to relocate her family away from 
family support or other resources. But, if he knows he lacks this 
perspective, he can seek it, requesting arguments and evidence that allow 
him to better evaluate the specific facts of the plaintiff’s claim. True “self-
inspection” is the ultimate interrupter of any bad cycle. 
265.  See Ginsberg, supra note 251, at 1652.  
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